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 financial crisis erupts when a large volume of assets in the financial system 
suddenly appears to be risky and investors want to get rid of their holdings. 
These  assets  become  “toxic”  –  not  simply  risky,  but  carrying  a  risk  that 
cannot be quantified. Toxic assets are not traded according to a normal risk-return 
calculus. Given that their risk cannot be calculated, their owners just want to sell 
them – sometimes at any price. 
In 2007-08, this was the case for a class of securities based on residential mortgages in 
the  United  States  (RMBS,  or  residential  mortgage-backed  securities).  During  the 
boom phase, these securities were sold as risk-free, on the assumption that US house 
prices would not decline, as this had never happened before in peacetime. 
But this assumption was shattered when a broad-based decline in real-estate prices 
began in 2007 and loss rates on mortgages suddenly increased. As a result, RMBS 
were found to be much riskier than anticipated. Initially, there was little basis for re-
pricing them rationally, because the event (a peacetime decline in US house prices) 
was  unprecedented.  Moreover,  banks  and  other  financial  institutions,  which  held 
large volumes of RMBS, were ill-equipped to measure the risk, and in some cases 
would have been forced into bankruptcy had they been obliged to sell their holdings 
at the fire-sale prices prevailing at the height of the crisis. 
The euro crisis followed a similar pattern. Until recently, public debt was considered 
the ultimate safe asset. Indeed, its risk-free status was embedded in the European 
Union’s regulatory framework, which allows banks to hold large volumes of any 
eurozone  country’s  public  debt  without  having  to put  aside  any  capital  to  cover 
potential losses. 
As with RMBS, the view that public debt was totally safe was underpinned by the 
‘fact’ that no advanced country, at least in the post-1945 era, had ever defaulted. 
Investors thus assumed that they did not need to assess the credit risk of eurozone 
countries’ (national) public debt. 
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The  de  facto  default  by  Greece  early  this  year  ended investors’  complacency.  The 
government bonds of peripheral eurozone countries thus became toxic. Given the 
unprecedented nature of the Greek default, the market valuation of peripheral debt 
has been fluctuating widely, still searching for ‘fundamentals’, such as deficit or debt 
levels, that could explain the evolution of risk premia over time. 
Moreover, many banks had so much public debt on their balance sheets that they 
would have been bankrupted in the event of a full-blown default. This led to extreme 
instability in the eurozone’s banking system. 
A  financial  crisis  ends  when  the  doubtful  debt  either  has  been  socialised  or  its 
valuation has stabilised and it has migrated to investors who are solvent enough to 
bear the risk. This was the case in the US. The authorities acquired some of the ‘toxic’ 
assets, which over time became easier to value, as a few years of data on mortgage 
delinquency rates allowed investors to find ways to measure the risk. 
The  market  prices  of  most  RMBS  rebounded  as  the  losses  resulting  from 
homeowners simply abandoning their properties were much lower than had been 
feared  at  the  height  of  the  crisis.  Moreover,  holdings  of  RMBS  migrated  to 
institutions that were able to support and manage the remaining risk. Today, RMBS 
are no longer considered toxic, allowing the market to function normally again. In 
the end, the US authorities even made a small profit on the assets that  they had 
acquired at the height of the crisis. 
This  pattern  can  be  only  partly  repeated  in  the  eurozone,  where  both  debt 
socialisation and a return to normal risk assessment appear more difficult. 
Limited  capacity  for  debt  socialisation  reflects  the  EU  Treaty’s  no-bailout  clause, 
which bars outright mutualisation at the eurozone level of (national) public debt. 
Moreover,  the  lending  capacity  of  the  new  rescue  fund,  the  European  Stability 
Mechanism (ESM), is capped at €700 billion ($905.6 billion), which represents only a 
fraction  of  the  total  public  debt  of  the  countries  potentially  needing  financial 
assistance. 
Only the European Central Bank can implement true socialisation of national debt in 
the eurozone. But EU law expressly forbids any form of ECB financing of deficits. 
A return to normal risk assessment is also more difficult in Europe. The European 
Council has solemnly declared that Greece’s de facto default (orchestrated through so-
called ‘private-sector involvement’ or PSI) remains an exceptional and unique case. 
But  the  promise  of  a  return  to  the  status  quo  ante  of  risk-free  public  debt  is  not 
compatible with the continuing limits on the socialisation of national debt. Indeed, 
the risk has become more concentrated as banks in the periphery have increased their 
investment in their own countries’ bonds. A sovereign default in Europe will never 
be a mere value to be plugged into some statistical risk model. 
These differences imply that the return to normal market conditions will be slower in 
the case of the euro crisis. Nevertheless, the crisis should abate somewhat, because 
the  most  risk-averse  institutions  have  by  now  sold  their  holdings  of  peripheral 
countries’ sovereign debt. Moreover, the ECB has clearly stated that it will not allow 
the euro to disintegrate. That guarantee has insured investors against their biggest 
risk. 